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We examine the problem of optimally allocating a ﬁxed budget
to a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent investment projects. The marginal
productivity of capital in a project is ﬁrst increasing then decreasing
with the amount of capital invested in it. When the total budget
is below some lower cutoﬀ value, the entire budget is invested in a
single project. Above this cutoﬀ, the share invested in a project can
be discontinuous and non-monotone in the total budget. Ultimately,
an upper cutoﬀ is reached. Above it, all projects receive more capital
as the budget increases. If the projects are identical, each will get the
same budget.
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11 Introduction
We address a simple capital allocation problem in which an agent can imple-
ment various investment projects at diﬀerent levels. In the public realm, this
could be a federal agency that has to determine a vaccination strategy for
a contagious disease, such as avian ﬂu, with a limited national vaccination
budget. Given that herd immunity develops, it is well known that the social
beneﬁts curve from a vaccination campaign is S- s h a p e di nt h ep r o p o r t i o n
of the vaccination inoculated in a locale. A similar problem arises if a very
limited amount of a drug is to be distributed to reduce new infections in a
nation heavily aﬄicted with HIV. An egalitarian allocation might have little
beneﬁcial eﬀect.
Our general model also applies to a range of private-sector allocation
problems. Thus, a credit-rationed entrepreneur may have the potential to
invest in various independent projects, each of which oﬀers increasing and
then decreasing returns to invested capital. Much R&D investment has this
character, as do eﬀorts to market a new product in diﬀerent areas.
The central ingredient of the general model is that the marginal beneﬁt
of each possible action is hump-shaped, i.e. the marginal beneﬁto fa na c t i o n
is maximum at some intermediate intensity of that action. The objective
function, which is the sum of the beneﬁts extracted from the diﬀerent actions,
is therefore not concave in the vector of decision variables. In fact, under this
assumption, it is tempting to give up the idea to distribute resources to all
projects, because of the low productivity from projects funded at a modest
scale.
The question of increasing returns in an economy has been widely studied,
in a theoretical framework, notably in the seventies. Indeed, with increas-
ing returns, a competitive market may lack an equilibrium. Many authors
proposed solutions to avoid this problem (see for instance Rader [10], Aoki
[1], Cremer [4], Brown and Heal [2] or Heal [6]). But here the issue is not
approached in this way. Another branch of the literature that is more closely
related to our topic concerns the analysis of the ﬁnancing of R&D projects.
Weitzman [13] considered the case where there are a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent
opportunities, each yielding an unknown reward. He proposed an algorithm
that tells at each stage whether or not to continue searching and if so, which
project to ﬁnance. This could apply to the optimal sequential search strategy
for developing various uncertain technologies that meet the same or similar
purpose. This model has been extended by Roberts and Weitzman [11] in
a more general framework. Our analysis approaches to this one expect that





Figure 1: The beneﬁt function as a function of the amount invested in the
speciﬁc project.
Section 2 motivates the paper by giving examples where the beneﬁtf u n c -
tion is S-shaped. Section 3 analyzes the problem when the investor faces
an inﬁnite number of identical projects. In section 4, we state some general
properties in the case of a low budget level. Section 5 is devoted to the analy-
sis of higher budget levels in the case of identical beneﬁt functions. Section
6 tackles the case of heterogeneous beneﬁt functions associated to a high
budget level and section 7 concludes.
2 S-Shaped Productivity in Various Domains
This section argues that a total productivity curve that is S-shaped is found
across a broad array of areas. The shape usually arises because two con-
ﬂicting forces are at work: (1) Small investments accomplish little. Thus,
$100,000 will not produce a sophisticated new invention, nor dent the na-
tional consciousness in a media campaign for a new product. (2) Beyond a
certain level of investment decreasing returns set in. Thus, the invention is
likely to have been developed if it will ever be developed at aﬀordable cost,
and the product will likely be widely known. Hence, productivity ﬁrst rises
with expenditure at an increasing rate, and then the rate decreases. The
S-shape emerges, as is shown in Figure 1.
The concept of herd immunity is well known in epidemiology. Each indi-
vidual who gets immunized against a communicable disease within a closed
population conveys a positive externality. Since he can no longer get the dis-
3ease, he can no longer communicate it to others. The ﬁrst few immunizations
yield little external beneﬁt, since there remain so many other individuals who
can still convey infection. However, once a signiﬁcant proportion of individ-
uals has been vaccinated, the whole population is substantially protected,
which leads to the label herd immunity. Beyond a certain point, additional
vaccinations therefore yield little additional protection (see for instance Fine
[5]).
Eﬀorts to produce inventions have long been recognized to exhibit an S-
shaped in the function relating probability of success to level of investment.
Such a shape is clearly delineated in the empirical analysis of patenting as a
function of R&D expenditures by a ﬁrm in Scherer [9] Figure 1. S-shaped
curves product performance are a driving concept behind Utterback’s [12]
(pp. 158-160) analysis of radical innovations, and Christensen’s [3] ( pp.
39-41)) model of disruptive technologies. Successor (radical or disruptive)
technologies come along when the ﬁrst technology is operating beyond its in-
ﬂection point. Kuznets [7] (pp. 31-33) noted the same S-shape phenomenon
for an industry as a whole, which might be relevant say for government R&D
and tax policies that seeks to push various industries forward.
Little [8] provides an overview look at the returns to aggregate advertising
of various products, drawing on the work of others. He identiﬁes S-shaped
responses, e.g., of sales/capita in response to advertising/capita, though he
also alerts readers to more complex patterns. He concludes (p. 639) "that
advertising models should accommodate S-shaped curves."
In general, in any investment arena where there is a range of increasing re-
turns, we should expect to ﬁnd S-shaped response curves. That is because we
know that decreasing returns set in, since except where natural resources are
involved, we do not see one product, or one ﬁrm, or one industry dominating
a major economy. When two or more entities must compete for investment,
and where those entities each experience S-shaped returns, the lessons of this
paper apply.
3 Benchmark: a continuous-choice model
We ﬁrst examine a simple model with an inﬁnite number of projects. Projects
are indexed by t, which can take any value between 0 and 1. If a budget
x∆t ≥ 0 is invested in projects in [t,t + ∆t],ab e n e ﬁt b(x)∆t is obtained
by the investor on this project. We assume that b(0) = 0,a n dt h a tf u n c t i o n
b is increasing in its argument. Finally, we assume, as shown in Figure 1
that there exists a critical investment level w0 such that function b is locally
convex in [0,w 0[, a n dt h a ti ti sl o c a l l yc o n c a v ei n]w0,+∞[.
4The investor is endowed with a budget w to ﬁnance these projects. A
budget allocation is described by a function x from [0,1] to R+,w h e r ex(t)
is the intensity of the investment in project indexed t ∈ [0,1]. The choice









x(t)dt = w. (2)
The objective function in (1) is the aggregate beneﬁt generated by the bud-
get allocation x(.), whereas constraint (2) states that the aggregate budget
devoted to the set of projects equals w (there will be equality, since marginal
productivity never turns negative for a project). The intensity of the invest-
ment in each project is constrained to be nonnegative. B(w) is the maximal
aggregate beneﬁt that can be obtained from budget w. The optimal budget
allocation, which is the solution of the above program, is denoted x∗(.).
The solution of this problem is simple and, we believe, well-known. It is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let w1 ≥ w0 be the intensity of investment that maximizes
the average beneﬁt b(x)/x. Two cases must be considered.
1. w ≤ w1 : In that case, it is optimal to invest x = w1 in a proportion
p = w/w1 of the projects. The other projects are not implemented at
all.
2. w>w 1 : In that case, it is optimal to invest x = w in all projects.
Proof: See the Appendix ¥
This proposition states that the optimal budget allocation depends upon
whether the available budget is smaller or larger than a critical value w1.
This critical value is the investment intensity that maximizes the beneﬁt b
per dollar invested: w1 is such that b0 (w1)=
b(w1)
w1 . When the available
budget is smaller than w1, it is optimal to select a proportion p = w/w1 of
the projects in which the investor invests a ﬁxed amount x = w1 in them.
All other projects are abandoned (x =0 ). Which projects are selected is
irrelevant, since all projects are assumed to have the same beneﬁtf u n c t i o n
in this section. When the available budget is relatively abundant, i.e., when w
5is larger than w1, it is optimal to implement the egalitarian strategy, because
of the concavity of the beneﬁt function in this region.
The aggregate beneﬁtf u n c t i o nB is therefore the concave envelope of the





w1 if w ≤ w1,
b(w) if w > w1.
(3)
Randomizing the allocation of resources concaviﬁes the beneﬁt function.
Let us now turn to the case where there is a ﬁnite number of projects,
identical or not, that is available to the investor.
4 Low budget levels: general case
I nt h ec a s eo faﬁnite number of beneﬁt functions b1,..., bn,i ti sm u c hm o r e
complex to solve the investor’s problem that reads
B (w)= m a x
x1...xn−1
b1 (x1)+... + bn−1 (xn−1)+bn (w − x1 − ... − xn−1)
subject to
xi ≥ 0 ∀i =1 ...n − 1, Pn−1
i=1 xi ≤ w.
However, when the budget level is low, the following lemma describes the
optimal allocation.
Lemma 1 Suppose there are n beneﬁt functions b1,···,b n each characterized
by w∗
i =a r gm a xbi (x)/x.I fw ≤ min
i
w∗
i, then the entire budget w goes to
the project with the highest beneﬁt function (with the highest bi (w)).
Proof: Suppose without loss of generality that w∗
1 =m i n i w∗
i and that
w ≤ w∗
1. Suppose moreover that x1,...,x n belongtoE = {xi ≥ 0 | x1 + ...xn = w}
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These n inequalities lead to







6Because this is true for all xi in E, the above inequality means that any
allocation (x1,...,xn) is dominated by an allocation in which the entire budget
is allocated to one project.¥




is optimal to invest the entire budget in the project with the highest beneﬁt
function because of the increasing returns to scale at low intensities. In the
case where the n beneﬁt functions are the same, the thresholds w∗
i are the
same and will be denoted w1. In this case, when the budget level is less than
w1, it is optimal to invest it entirely in one of the projects. But contrary to the
continuous case, the determination of the optimal allocation is quite diﬃcult
in this alternative model with n heterogeneous projects. In particular, it
need not be optimal to ﬁnance an increasing number of projects when the
total budget is larger. The following parts will be devoted to the study of
t h eo p t i m a la l l o c a t i o ni nt h ec a s eo fh i g h e rb u d g e tl e v e l s . W ea r eg o i n gt o
solve this problem in two steps, focusing ﬁrst on the case of identical beneﬁt
functions, and studying then heterogeneous beneﬁt functions.
5 When the budget level increases: the case
of identical beneﬁtf u n c t i o n s
To have an intuition of the results, we ﬁrst analyze the case of two identical
beneﬁt functions. We then extend the results to a ﬁnite number of beneﬁt
functions using induction arguments.
5.1 Two identical projects
5.1.1 General properties
If x and w−x denote the budget invested in each project, the choice problem
is
B(w)= m a x
0≤x≤w
b(x)+b(w − x).( 4 )
There exist three types of solutions to this maximization program as the
following proposition tells us.
Proposition 2 The optimal solution of problem (4) belongs to one of the
following three types
1. the full-specialization type x∗ ∈ {0,w},
2. the symmetric -or egalitarian- type x∗ = w/2,
73. the asymmetric interior type {b x(w),w− b x(w)} where b x(w) <w 0 <
w − b x(w) and b0 (b x(w)) = b0 (w − b x(w)).
Notice that program (4) is symmetric relative to w/2. Therefore, in the
rest of our discussion of the 2 identical-projects case, we are going to focus
on solutions that are greater or equal to w/2. The full-specialization solution
will designate w, the equal solution w/2 and the asymmetric interior solution
w − b x(w). In the case of the full-specialization solution, the entire budget
is devoted to only one project. In the case of the symmetric solution, both
projects get exactly the same amount, and in the case of the asymmetric
interior solution, the two projects get a diﬀerent positive amount.
According to Lemma 1, when w is less than w1, all the budget is devoted
to a unique project. The following lemmas give ﬁrst properties of the solution
for higher budget levels.
Lemma 2 The symmetric solution is a local minimum if w<2w0.
Proof: The second-order derivative of the objective function of program
(4) with respect to the decision variable equals 2b00(w/2) when evaluated at
x = w/2. By assumption, this is positive since w/2 is smaller than w0. ¥
The intuition is again based on the assumption that the marginal beneﬁt
of individual projects is increasing for small investment levels. In particular,
when the total budget is less than 2w0, the symmetric solution x = w −
x = w/2 lies in the range of increasing marginal beneﬁts. In that case, a
marginal deviation from the equal allocation raises the total beneﬁt. Thus
the diversiﬁed allocation cannot be optimal when the total budget is smaller
than 2w0. Only the specialized solution or the interior solution is possible
for this range of the total budget.
In the next lemma, we determine the condition under which the special-
ized solution dominates the diversiﬁed one.
Lemma 3 There exists a single w2 ∈ R ∪{+∞} such that b(w) ≥ 2b(w/2)
for all w ≤ w2 and b(w) ≤ 2b(w/2) for all w>w 2.
Proof: See the Appendix.¥
In words, w2 is the unique critical wealth level below which full-specialization
dominates the symmetric solution, and above which the symmetric alloca-
tion is preferred to full-specialization. This implies that, when the budget is
increased, it is never optimal to switch from the diversiﬁed solution to the
specialized one. The following proposition provides more insights about how
the optimal strategy evolves as the budget level w is increased.
8Proposition 3 Consider the case of two identical projects. The optimal in-
vestment strategy has the following characteristics:
1. For low budget levels, the full-specialization strategy is optimal;
2. Then, as the total budget level w increases, the optimal strategy can
switch to an asymmetric interior solution, or directly to the symmetric
allocation ;
3. Once the symmetric allocation is selected, it remains optimal for all
larger w.
Proof: See the Appendix. ¥
According to Proposition 3, once a strategy (an asymmetric interior so-
lution or the equal strategy) dominates the full-specialization strategy for a
given budget level w, the full-specialization strategy will not be optimal for
any budget level that is higher than w. Moreover, if the symmetric strategy is
optimal for a given budget level, it will remain optimal for any higher budget
levels. How can we intuitively explain the results of Proposition 3? When the
budget level is low, the investor prefers to favour one project by investing the
whole budget in it because of the low productivity at low budget levels. On
the contrary, when the total budget level is high enough, the investor prefers
to share the budget equally between both projects because of the projects’
decreasing productivity from w0 on. In between, the investor wants to invest
a strictly positive amount in each project but he still favours one project to
the detriment of the other. It is not worth to invest everything in a single
project since, from the inﬂection point on, marginal beneﬁto fi n v e s t i n gi na
project is decreasing. However, the investor prefers to take advantage of the
high productivity for one project and a lower productivity for the other.
To illustrate Proposition 3, we consider an example where the beneﬁt
function is given by
b(x)=
xγ
xγ + k(1 − x)γ,
with γ =2and k =2 . Observe that w0 =0 .613 and w1 =0 .816 in this
n u m e r i c a le x a m p l e .W eh a v ed r a w nt h eo p t i m a ls t r a t e g ya saf u n c t i o no ft h e
total budget w in Figure 2. When w is smaller than 1, it is optimal to invest
everything in one project. When w is between 1 and 1.225, the asymmetric
interior solution is optimal. Finally, for larger w, the symmetric strategy is
optimal.
Concerning asymmetric interior solutions, let us observe that, as wealth
w increases, one of the two projects will get a smaller budget, as seen in












Figure 2: The optimal investment in projects 1 and 2 as a function of the
total budget.
Figure 2.1 This comes from the full diﬀerentiation of the ﬁrst-order condition
(b0(x∗) − b0(w − x∗)
½
=0 if x∗ <w ,




b00(w − b x)
b00(b x)+b00(w − b x)
and




b00(b x)+b00(w − b x)
.
Because b x<w 0 <w− b x, b00(b x) is positive and b00(w − b x) is negative, which
implies that db x/dw and d(w − b x)/dw must have opposite signs.
To get more information on the evolution of the solution to the max-
imization program (4) when the total budget level increases, we hereafter
study three particular classes of functions: symmetric beneﬁt functions, ben-
eﬁt functions that are “pulled down”, and beneﬁt functions that are “lifted
up”.
1Observe that there is another reason for why the project-speciﬁc budgets do not in-
crease monotonically the total budget. When the optimal strategy switches from full spe-
cialization to full diversiﬁcation, the previously ﬁnanced project gets a 50% reduction in
its budget.
105.1.2 Symmetric Beneﬁt Functions
As y m m e t r i cb e n e ﬁt function can be seen as either having symmetric ﬁrst
order derivatives with respect to the inﬂection point w0, or as a 180◦ rotated
function from the part below w0 t ot h ep a r ta b o v ew0. In this case, the
marginal beneﬁt function is symmetric relative to the axis w = w0.W i t h
such a beneﬁt function, any asymmetric interior allocation b x is excluded and
the unique switching wealth level w2 equals 2w0, as stated by the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that b0 is symmetric in the sense that b0(w0 + δ)=
b0(w0 − δ) for all δ ∈ [0,w 0]. Then, the fully specialized strategy is optimal
if w is smaller than 2w0, whereas the symmetric strategy is optimal if w is
larger than 2w0.
Proof: See the Appendix. ¥
When the beneﬁt function is symmetric, the optimal strategy is full-
specialization when w ≤ 2w0, and is egalitarian otherwise. In other words,
for any budget w below 2w0, one project gets all the budget w, otherwise
the two projects get exactly the same amount w/2. This special case serves
as a benchmark for the next two cases, where the beneﬁtf u n c t i o ni sn o t
symmetric.
The analysis is simplest if it is conducted using the marginal beneﬁt
function. We consider two cases. In the ﬁrst, beyond the inﬂection point both
the total and marginal functions lie below their equivalent function for the
hypothetical symmetric case2. We refer to this as having the beneﬁt functions
(both total and marginal) “pulled down”. In the second case, both the total
and marginal beneﬁt functions lie above their symmetric counterparts. We
call this the “lifted up” case.
5.1.3 “Pulled Down” (PD) Beneﬁt Functions
Let us ﬁrst give the deﬁnition of a beneﬁt function that is stretched to the
left.
Deﬁnition 1 Ab e n e ﬁtf u n c t i o ni ss a i dt ob ep u l l e dd o w n( P D )i fb0(w0 +δ)
≤ b0(w0 − δ) for all δ ∈ [0,w 0].
2When the total beneﬁt function is symmetric, the shape of the marginal beneﬁt func-
tion to the right of the inﬂection point is a mirror reﬂection of what is to the left. For the
asymmetric case, if the marginal beneﬁt function lies below its symmetric counterpart,
then the corresponding total beneﬁt function will also lie below its counterpart, but the
reverse is not true.













Figure 3: Marginal beneﬁt function in the PD case.
If a beneﬁt function is PD, beyond the inﬂection point w0 the marginal
beneﬁtc u r v ei sp u l l e dt ot h el e f ts ot h a ti tl i e se v e r y w h e r eb e l o wt h es y m -
metric case curve. In Figure 3, the marginal beneﬁtf u n c t i o ni nt h eP Dc a s e
is represented.
Given PD, once the maximal productivity b0 (w0) has been reached, the
increase in productivity is less than in the symmetric case. The following
lemma allows us to check that w2 is smaller than 2w0. This is useful since
it implies that for all budget levels larger than 2w0, the symmetric strategy
dominates the fully specialized one.
Lemma 4 Suppose that the beneﬁtf u n c t i o nb is PD. Then, w2 < 2w0.
Proof: We are going to prove that b(2w0) < 2b(w0).
b(2w0)=
R w0





0 b0 (w0 − δ)dδ +
R w0
0 b0 (w0 + δ)dδ
< 2
R w0
0 b0 (w0 − δ)dδ
=2 b(w0).
Therefore, b(2w0) < 2b(w0) and w2 < 2w0.¥
In the next proposition, we show that, when w>2w0, the egalitarian
strategy is the optimal one, i.e., no asymmetric allocation is superior.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the beneﬁt function b is PD. Then, the sym-
metric strategy is optimal whenever w>2w0.











Figure 4: A PD beneﬁt function
Proof: See the Appendix. ¥
When the beneﬁt function is PD and the budget level is larger than
2w0, it is optimal to share equally the budget between the two projects.
Remember that we obtained the same result in the symmetric case. Because
the increase in productivity from w0 o ni sl e s sr a p i dt h a ni nt h es y m m e t r i c
case, the attractiveness of the specialized solution is weakened. Since it was
already inferior to the egalitarian solution in the symmetric case, this result
is reinforced in the PD case.












If α =0 , b is a symmetric function with respect to w0.I fα is negative,
function b is PD, and if α is positive, function b is lifted up. In Figure 4, we
take α to be equal to −0.1. In this case, w0 =0 .474 and w2 =0 .921 < 2w0.
For w>2w0 =0 .948, the symmetric allocation is optimal as we see on
the graph. An asymmetric interior solution exists when w ≤ 2w0.
5.1.4 “Lifted Up” (LU) Beneﬁt Functions
A second important case arises when both the total and marginal beneﬁt
functions are “lifted up”, so they lie above their hypothetical symmetric
functions. We deﬁne this term more formally as












Figure 5: Optimal strategies for a PD beneﬁt function.
Deﬁnition 2 Ab e n e ﬁtf u n c t i o ni ss a i dt ob el i f t e du p( L U )i fb0(w0 + δ) ≥
b0(w0 − δ) for all δ ∈ [0,w 0].
If a beneﬁt function is LU, beyond the inﬂection point w0 the marginal
beneﬁtc u r v ei sp u l l e dt ot h er i g h ts ot h a ti tl i e se v e r y w h e r ea b o v et h es y m -
metric case curve. Therefore, the increase in productivity is more rapid than
in the symmetric case beyond w0. Intuitively, this reinforces the attractive-
ness of the more specialized strategies. In other words, it should be more
likely that one project has a greater share of the total budget than the other
even when w>2w0. This contrasts with the case where the beneﬁtf u n c -
tion is PD and where as soon as 2w0 is reached, both projects get the same
amount. Note also that if a beneﬁtf u n c t i o ni sL U ,i tc a n n o tb eP D ,t h e r e f o r e
LU and PD are mutually exclusive. However, these two notions are not mu-
tually inclusive since a beneﬁt function might be neither PD nor LU. In the
next lemma, we give the ranking of w2 with respect to 2w0 for a LU beneﬁt
function.
Lemma 5 Suppose that the beneﬁtf u n c t i o nb is LU. Then w2 > 2w0.
14Proof: We are going to prove that b(2w0) > 2b(w0).
b(2w0)=
R w0





0 b0 (w0 − δ)dδ +
R w0
0 b0 (w0 + δ)dδ,
> 2
R w0
0 b0 (w0 − δ)dδ,
=2 b(w0).
Therefore, b(2w0) > 2b(w0) and w2 > 2w0.¥
L e tu si n t r o d u c et h eq u a n t i t yx(δ) deﬁned by b0 (w0 − δ)=b0 (x(δ)),w i t h
x(δ) >w 0.I ti sd e ﬁned for all δ ∈ [0,w 0].I nf a c t ,f o re a c hδ,t h e r ee x i s t sa
w(δ) such that x(δ)=w(δ)−(w0 − δ) and w0−δ is an asymmetric interior
solution. We are interested in the quantity z (δ)=x(δ)−(w0 + δ) (see Figure
6). It corresponds to the horizontal distance between both curves. As b is
LU, we know that z (δ) ≥ 0 for all δ ∈ [0,w 0]. A condition on this function
z (.) allows us to characterize the shape of the optimal solution in the case
of a LU beneﬁt function.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the beneﬁt function b is LU.
1. If w ≤ 2w0, then the full-specialization strategy is optimal.
2. If w>2w0 and if δ 7−→ z (δ) is increasing, then the optimal strategy
cannot be an asymmetric interior one.
Proof: See the Appendix. ¥
We see that, in the LU case, the egalitarian strategy will not in general
be optimal even when w>2w0.I f f u n c t i o n z is increasing, we have a
complete characterization of the solution: it employs the full-specialization
strategy for w ≤ w2 and then switches to the equal-allocation strategy for
w>w 2.B e c a u s e w2 > 2w0, even when the total budget is higher than
2w0,i ti ss t i l lo p t i m a lt of a v o u ro n ep r o j e c t .T h i si sd u et ot h em o r er a p i d
increase in the productivity beyond w0 relative to the symmetric case. Given
that z is an increasing function, the marginal productivity decreases less
rapidly than in the symmetric case. A LU beneﬁt function is thus all the
more attractive. Thanks to this condition, an interior allocation satisfying
the ﬁrst order condition is a local minimum and should therefore not be
taken into account for the search of the optimal solution (the second order
condition is not satisﬁed). If the condition stated in Proposition 6 is not
satisﬁed, the asymmetric solution may be a local maximum. Therefore, the
optimal strategy may be to begin with the full-specialization strategy when
w is very low, and as w increases to switch successively to an asymmetric
interior solution and then to the equal-allocation strategy.











F i g u r e6 :AL Um a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt function together with function z.
T oi l l u s t r a t et h i sc a s e ,w ec o n s i d e rt h ee x a m p l eo ft h ep r e v i o u sp a r a g r a p h
with a positive α, which implies that the beneﬁt function is LU. In this case,
the optimal allocation belongs to {w,w/2} a c c o r d i n gt ot h er a n k i n go fw
with respect to w2 (if it exists). For this numerical example, we take α to be
equal to 0.2. The marginal beneﬁt function of each project is represented on
Figure 6 together with function z (.).
Since function z (.) is increasing, no asymmetric interior solution will be
adopted. In this case, w0 =0 .545 and w2 =1 .157. The full-specialization
strategy is optimal for w ≤ 1.157 and the equal strategy is optimal for
w>1.157 as we can see on Figure 7.
In order to understand the importance of the condition we imposed on
function z, we construct an example of a LU beneﬁt function for which func-
tion z is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing3. We start with the symmetric
beneﬁtf u n c t i o nb∗ (x)=π
2 arctan(2x − 1)+1
2 a n dt h e nc o n s t r u c tt h er e q u i r e d






















b∗ (x)+C if x ≥ 2w0.
K, A, B, C, a, b, c are chosen such that functions b0 and b are continuous.
Note that b∗ and b have the same inﬂection point (see Figure 8)
3Edward Shpiz helped with this counterexample.










Figure 7: Optimal strategy for a LU beneﬁt function.











F i g u r e8 :AL Ub e n e ﬁt function when function z is not increasing.










Figure 9: Optimal allocations for a LU beneﬁt function when z is not in-
creasing.
The numerical resolution of this example shows that there is a range of
budget levels such that an asymmetric interior solution is optimal. If the
condition on function z is not satisﬁed, an asymmetric interior solution may
be a local maximum. Therefore, as this example shows us, there may exist
a range of w for which the maximum of the sum of the two beneﬁt functions
is achieved for an asymmetric interior solution.
This family of functions helps us to characterize more precisely the shape
of the solution and to give conditions under which the optimal strategy is
readily characterized. We extend these results to the case of a ﬁnite number
of identical beneﬁt functions in the next section.
5.2 n identical projects
As already stated in section 3, with n projects, the investor has to solve the
maximization program
B (w)= m a x
x1,...,xn−1
b(x1)+... + b(xn−1)+b(w − x1 − ... − xn−1) (5)
18subject to
xi ≥ 0,∀i =1 ...n − 1, Pn−1
i=1 xi ≤ w.
It is convenient to maximize this beneﬁt function in two steps.
1. A ﬁrst maximization
max
x1,...,xn−2
b(x1)+... + b(xn−1)+b(w − x1 − ... − xn−1) (6)
is equivalent to ﬁnding the optimal allocation between n − 1 projects
w h e nt h et o t a lb u d g e tl e v e lt h a ti sa v a i l a b l ei se q u a lt ow−xn−1.T h es o -
lutions to this maximization are denoted x∗
1 (xn−1,w),...,x∗
n−2 (xn−1,w).
















1 (xn−1,w) − ... − x
∗
n−2 (xn−1,w) − xn−1
¢
.
Therefore, this kind of problem has to be solved using induction argu-
ments. This is the methodology we are going to use diﬀerentiating the cases
depending on the shape of the beneﬁt functions. Before doing this, let us










,∀i =2 ...n − 1. (8)
Note that we recover the deﬁnition of w2.I nt h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m a ,w ep r o v e
the uniqueness of these thresholds, and we rank them.
Lemma 6 The thresholds w2,...,w n are uniquely deﬁned by equation (8) and
satisfy
w0 <w 2 <. . .<w i < ... < wn.























Proof: See the Appendix. ¥
If you only consider equal allocations among the ﬁnanced projects, Lemma
6 tells us that as the total budget w increases, it is optimal to share it equally
b e t w e e na ni n c r e a s i n gn u m b e ro fp r o j e c t s( 1 ,t h e n2 ,t oﬁnally end up with
the ﬁnancing of all n projects).
195.2.1 The Case of a Symmetric BeneﬁtF u n c t i o n
I nt h ec a s eo fas y m m e t r i cb e n e ﬁt function, the optimal allocation is quite
natural as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose b is a symmetric beneﬁt function. Then, the optimal
strategy is to share equally the budget between all ﬁnanced projects. Moreover,
• If w<w 2, only one project gets the entire budget w;
• ∀w ∈ [wi,w i+1[, i projects are ﬁnanced ,∀i =2 ...n − 1;
• If w ≥ wn,t h e na l lt h en projects are ﬁnanced.
Proof: See the Appendix.¥
We have generalized the result of the previous section with two identi-
cal beneﬁt functions. As wealth increases, the optimal strategy is to share
equally the total amount between an increasing number of projects. In this
section, we consider homogenous beneﬁt functions; therefore which projects
among the n are selected is not relevant. It is interesting to note that the
total number of projects available to the investor does not modify the thresh-
olds wi. Indeed, the switching point between the ﬁnancing of i projects and
(i +1 )projects is independent of n. Therefore, the ﬁnancing of the ﬁrst n
projects is only modiﬁed once the last project begins to be ﬁnanced since up
this point, the allocation each project gets is w
n+1 instead of w
n.W en o wt u r n
to the study of other families of functions.
5.2.2 The Case of a LU BeneﬁtF u n c t i o n
It is diﬃcult to extend the results concerning PD beneﬁt functions in the
case of n diﬀerent projects. Indeed, recall that in the two projects case, we
did not ﬁnd a condition under which no asymmetric interior solution exists.
Therefore, in this study of the n projects case, we generalize the 2 projects
case we focus on to the case of pulled down beneﬁt functions.
Proposition 8 Suppose b is a LU beneﬁt function and δ 7→ z (δ) is an in-
creasing function. Then, the optimal strategy is to share equally the budget
between all ﬁnanced projects. Moreover,
• If w<w 2, only one project gets the entire budget w;
• ∀w ∈ [wi,w i+1[, i projects are ﬁnanced ∀i =2 ...n − 1;
• If w ≥ wn,t h e na l lt h en projects are ﬁnanced.










Figure 10: Optimal strategy for a LU beneﬁt function with three identical
projects.
Proof: See the Appendix.¥
If the beneﬁtf u n c t i o ni sL U ,t h ed e c r e a s ei np r o d u c t i v i t yf o rw e a l t hl e v e l s
higher or equal than w0 is less rapid than in the symmetric case. Therefore,
it is optimal to increase the number of ﬁnanced projects as the total budget
w increases and to share it equally between all ﬁnanced projects. We present
t h er e s u l ti nt h ec a s eo faL Ub e n e ﬁt function and of 3 projects on Figure 10











and α =0 .2.
In this part, we managed to give the shape of the optimal allocation when
the budget level increases in the case of a ﬁnite number of identical beneﬁt
functions. Now, we determine how these results generalize to the case of
heterogeneous beneﬁt functions.
216 When the budget level increases: the case
of heterogeneous beneﬁtf u n c t i o n s




case of heterogeneous beneﬁt functions. Heterogeneity makes the problem
much trickier. We begin this analysis with the study of an example of three
heterogeneous beneﬁt functions.
6.1 Example
The three beneﬁt functions we study are
b1 (x)=b2 (x)=
½
0 if 0 <x<50,
50 + x−50





0.1x if 0 <x<50,
2(x − 50) + 5 if 50 ≤ x<100,
105 if x ≥ 100.
The investor’s program is then
max







x + y ≤ w.
The total beneﬁt functions are represented in Figure 11. Beneﬁt functions
b1 (x) and b2 (x) are LU. It is therefore possible to state the investor’s problem
(9) in two steps, maximizing it ﬁrst with respect to y.
max
y b1 (y)+b2 (w − x − y)+b3 (x)
subject to
0 ≤ y ≤ w − x.
The solution to this maximization with two identical LU beneﬁtf u n c t i o n si s




w − x if w − x<100,
w−x
2 if w − x ≥ 100.










Figure 11: Beneﬁt functions b1 (x), b2 (x) and b3 (x).
This leads to the second step
max
x b1 (y
∗ (x,w)) + b2 (w − x − y






y∗ (x,w) ≥ 0,
x + y∗ (x,w) ≤ w.
1. y∗ (x,w)=w − x:i nt h i sc a s e ,t h ei n v e s t o r ’ sp r o g r a m( 1 0 )r e d u c e st o
max
x b1 (w − x)+b3 (x),
subject to
0 ≤ x ≤ w.
This program does not accept any interior solution since the ﬁrst deriv-
atives of functions b1 and b3 never coincide. Therefore, the solutions





0 if 50 <x<80,
w otherwise.
232. y∗ (x,w)=w−x



















0 if w ≥ 110,
w otherwise.
Combining the two solutions and comparing the three functions b1 (x),
2b1 (x/2) and b3 (x) gives the solution to (9). (Recall that x(w) is the amount
invested in project 1, w − x(w) − y(w) the one in project 2 and y(w) the
one in project 3.):
• If w ≤ 50,t h e nx(w)=w − x(w) − y(w)=0and y(w)=w,
• If 50 <w≤ 80,t h e nx(w)=0 ,w− x(w) − y(w)=w and y(w)=0
(which from project 1 or project 2 gets the ﬁnancing is irrelevant here
since the have both the same beneﬁt function),
• If 80 <w<110,t h e nx(w)=w − x(w) − y(w)=0and y(w)=w,
• If w ≥ 110,t h e nx(w)=w − x(w) − y(w)=w/2 and y(w)=0 .
The solution is depicted on Figure 12.
The ﬁgure shows the counterintuitive nature of the results as w increases.
Thus, project 3 begins with ﬁnancing, loses ﬁnancing, then regains ﬁnancing,
and then loses it once again. When it is ﬁnanced, it gets the total budget.
Project 1 is only ﬁnanced when the budget w is high enough. Project 2
is successively not ﬁnanced, ﬁnanced, not ﬁnanced to ﬁn a l l ye n du pb e i n g
ﬁnancing but contrary to project 3, when it is ﬁnanced, it is not always the
case that it gets the whole ﬁnancing. Let us try to recover some features of
this example in a more general setting.




























Figure 12: Optimal allocations with three beneﬁtf u n c t i o nb1, b2 and b3.










Figure 13: Beneﬁt functions b and c.
256.2 General Case
We consider two heterogeneous projects; the second operates at a much larger
scale than the ﬁrst one. Their beneﬁt functions are
b(x) and c(x)=kb(x/j) with 1 <k<j .( 1 1 )
They are represented on Figure 13.
Denote w∗
1 =a r gm a x b(x)/x (resp. w∗






2 = c0 (w∗
2)=( k/j)b0 (w∗




1.M o r e o v e r , x 7→ b(x)/x is increasing on [0,w ∗
1] and x/j < x.























and ∀x ≤ w∗
1,b(x) >c(x). According to Lemma 1, if the total budget level
w is less than w∗
1,t h e np r o j e c tb gets the entire budget w and project c
gets nothing. Indeed, for low budget levels, project b is more proﬁtable than
project c and gets the entire ﬁnancing. Before going further into the study of




b(w − x)+c(x). (12)
Proposition 9 Suppose b is a beneﬁt function and c(x)=kb(x/j) with
1 <k<j . The optimal solution of program (12) belongs to one of the
following ﬁve types:
1. x(w)=0:the whole budget goes to project b,
2. x(w)=w : the whole budget goes to project c,








j <w− b x1 (w).
This solution will be called “interior solution 1”,















+ b00(w − x) ≤ 0. This solution will be called “interior
solution 2”,















+ b00(w − x) ≤ 0. This solution will be called “interior
solution 3”.
Proof: See the Appendix.¥
In this case, there exist two interior solutions. Taking the derivative of


















+ b00 (w − b xi (w))
and (13)



















j and w−b xi (w),i=1 ,2,3 relative to w0 allows us to note
that b x1 (w) and b x2 (w) are increasing functions of w, b x3 (w) is a decreasing
function of w. w − b x1 (w) and w − b x3 (w) are increasing functions of w,b u t
w − b x2 (w) is a decreasing function of w. When the interior solution 2 solves
the maximization program (12), project c gets an increasing amount of the
total budget whereas project b g e t sad e c r e a s i n ga m o u n to ft h et o t a lb u d g e t .
This result is similar than in the case of homogenous beneﬁt function. Quite
the opposite happens with the interior solution 3: project b gets an increasing
amount of the total budget whereas project c gets a decreasing amount of
t h et o t a lb u d g e t .T h i si sn o tt h ec a s ea n y m o r ew i t ht h ei n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n1 ,
where the two optimal solutions are increasing functions of the total budget
w: as the budget increases, each project gets more ﬁnancing. The following
proposition4 characterizes the optimal allocation.
Proposition 10 Suppose b is a LU beneﬁt function, b0 is concave, δ 7→ z (δ)
is increasing and c(x)=kb(x/j) with 1 <k<j . The optimal solution to
the maximization program (12) has the following characteristics:
1. When x ≤ w∗
1,p r o j e c tb gets the whole budget,
2. When interior solution 1, b x1 (w), is the optimal allocation, it will re-
main so for any higher budget level.
4Edward Shpiz helped with this Proposition and with Proposition 9.
27Proof: See the Appendix.¥
The path of the optimal allocation between the two projects as a function
of the budget is quite diﬀerent from the case where the beneﬁtf u n c t i o n sw e r e
identical. No general result indeed holds on the way the diﬀerent allocations
link together. However, there are two similarities. First, when the budget
level is very low, only one project, project b,i sﬁnanced. Second, once the
interior solution 1 is reached, the funding of each project increases with w.
But contrary to the identical beneﬁtf u n c t i o n sc a s e ,t h et w op r o j e c t sa r en o t
ﬁnanced at the same level. Between the allocation that gives all the budget
to project b and the interior solution 1, anything may happen. In particular,
each project can have an allocation that is an increasing function of the total
budget whereas the allocation of the other project is a decreasing function
of the total budget (interior solutions 2 and 3). Moreover, it can be the case
that one project stops being ﬁnanced (when project c gets all the budget). It
can also happen that the three allocations mix together. In order to illustrate


















with α =0 .05, k =1 .8 and j =2 . With these parameters, the inﬂection
point, w0,i se q u a lt o0.5122,a n dw∗
1 =0 .7478. The numerical resolution of
this example gives the following results (that are depicted on Figure 14):
• If w<1.1306, then project b gets the entire budget,
• If 1.1306 <w<1.2407, then the optimal solution is the interior solu-
tion 2. The two projects are ﬁnanced, but as w increases, project b is
less ﬁnanced whereas project c is more ﬁnanced,
• If 1.2407 <w<1.6296,t h e np r o j e c tc gets the whole budget w,
• If 1.6296 <w<1.7073, the interior solution 2 is once again the optimal
solution,
• If w>1.7073, the interior solution 1 is optimal, meaning that the
funding of each project increases with w.
When the budget level is low, only project b gets ﬁnancing. But as soon
as the budget level w increases and once the inﬂexion point is crossed, it
becomes less proﬁtable whereas project c still presents an increasing marginal
productivity. Therefore, project c begins to be funded and project b gets a
lower share of the total budget before being totally abandoned. There is a










Figure 14: Optimal allocations with heterogeneous beneﬁt functions.
range of budget levels for which project c gets the whole budget: indeed, for
these values of w, both marginal productivities are decreasing, but project c
still presents a higher marginal productivity. But on [1.6296,1.7073], project
b comes back to life. The two decreasing marginal productivities get closer,
but the dominance of project c relative to project b makes b lose funding
as the budget increases. Once the last threshold 1.7073 is crossed, both
projects get an increasing funding as w gets larger. Indeed, the two marginal
productivities, while decreasing, converge and the two projects are worth
being ﬁnanced with a strictly positive budget share. The optimal allocation
is thus much more complex than in the homogenous case; indeed the ﬁnancing
o fe a c hp r oj e c tm a yn o tb em o n o t o n ew i t ht h eb u d g e tl e v e lw.I ti sd i ﬃcult to
get a more precise description of the optimal allocation, but the main result is
that after a succession of ﬁnancing and non-ﬁnancing of the diﬀerent projects,
they both end up being ﬁnanced in an increasing way as the total funding
increases.
297C o n c l u s i o n
We study the investment decision of an investor with multiple available
projects, each presenting a range of increasing returns. Such decisions are
common across a great range of ﬁelds, such as allocating R&D investment,
advertising budgets, or inoculations for communicable diseases. With n iden-
tical projects, for low budget levels, the investor favours one project by in-
vesting the whole budget in it. As soon as he decides to invest a strictly
positive amount in each project for a given budget level, he will keep on
investing strictly positive amounts in each project.
The properties of the optimal allocation are most easily seen with just
two projects. As the budget increases, allocations may be unequal though
positive, and a project may actually experience a reduction in budget over
some range. When the total budget level is high enough, the investor shares
equally the budget between the two projects and this equal strategy remains
optimal for any higher budget level. When the beneﬁt function has a plausible
shape, what we label lifted up, the optimal investment strategy goes from
full specialization to equal division without passing through a range with
positive but unequal division. These results extend immediately to the case
of a ﬁnite number of projects.
Matters are more complex when the beneﬁtf o rt h ep r o j e c t sm a yd i f -
fer. Qualitatively, however, the same local and global marginal eﬃciency
requirements must be satisﬁed, and the prime features of eﬃcient allocations
are maintained. Thus, ﬁrst one project gets all resources. Then there is a
range where multiple projects get funding, and the funding for some way be
non-monotonic with the total budget. Finally, when the budget is large, all
projects get funded, and the funding for each increases as the budget grows
further. In short, an apparently straightforward resource allocation problem
turns out to have an intriguingly complex solution, despite perfectly intuitive
eﬃciency conditions.
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31Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Let λ denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint (2). The
ﬁrst-order condition of program (1) reads
b
0(x(t)) = λ,
for all t such that x(t) > 0. The second-order condition is written as
b00(x(t)) ≤ 0. By construction, there can be at most one x that satisﬁes
these two conditions. Therefore, all projects that are going to be ﬁnanced
will get the same budget x.L e tp denote the proportion of projects that will











By construction, b(x)/x is single-peaked at some x = w1. Two cases must be
examined when solving this maximization program. The ﬁrst case prevails
when w is smaller or equal than w1. In that case, the solution to program
(15) is x = w1 (and the proportion p = w/w1 of ﬁnanced projects is less than
one). Otherwise, the optimal solution is the corner solution x = w and p =1 .
B Proof of Proposition 2
If we denote by λ the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint
x ≤ w, the Lagrangian of program (4) reads:
L = b(x)+b(w − x)+λ(w − x)







=0 if x∗ <w ,
≥ 0 if x∗ = w. (16)
So, if λ>0, the constraint binds and x = w is the solution of the program.
32On the contrary, if λ =0 ,t h e nb0(x∗)−b0(w −x∗)=0 . This solution has
two possible solutions: either x∗ = w/2 or x∗ = b x. Because of the properties
of the beneﬁtf u n c t i o n( b0 is increasing if x ≤ w0 and b0 is decreasing if
x ≥ w0), this last possibility is possible iﬀ b x<w 0 <w− b x. Indeed, suppose
by contradiction that w0 <x ∗ <w− x∗. Then, consider an alternative
allocation (x∗ +ε,w−x∗ −ε) with 0 <ε<(w−2x∗)/2.B e c a u s eb is locally




∗ + ε)+b(w − x
∗ − ε).
This is a contradiction.¥
C Proof of Lemma 3
We study function x 7−→ f (x)=b(x) − 2b(x/2).T h e l o c a l c o n v e x i t y
of the function b on the interval [0,w 0] implies that f0 (x) ≥ 0 for all
x<w 0. In the same way, the local concavity of b for x>w 0,i m p l i e s
that f0 (x) ≤ 0 ∀x>2w0. We hereafter show that there exists a unique a
such that f0 (x)=0 . Suppose by contradiction that there exist a1 and a2,




Note that b0 (ai/2) = b0 (ai) is possible only if ai/2 <w 0 <a i.T h u s ,w em u s t
have that w0 <a 1 <a 2, which implies in turn that b0 (a1) >b 0 (a2). Similarly,
we must have that a1/2 <a 2/2 <w 0, which implies that b0 (a1/2) <b 0 (a2/2).
Combining this last result with the initial assumption that b0 (ai/2) = b0 (ai)
implies that b0 (a1)=b0 (a1/2) <b 0 (a2/2) = b0 (a2),o re q u i v a l e n t l yb0 (a1) <
b0 (a2), a contradiction. It follows that there exists a unique a such that
∀x ≤ af 0 (x) ≥ 0,
∀x ≥ af 0 (x) ≤ 0. .
Therefore, f is increasing on [0,a] and decreasing on [a,+∞[.A sf (0) = 0,
if a positive zero exists to f, it is unique. It implies that f changes sign only
once, from positive to negative.¥
D Proof of Proposition 3
We are going to show the following three assertions:
1. As w increases, one can never switch from the fully diversiﬁed solution
to the full-specialization one.
332. As w increases, one can never switch from an asymmetric interior so-
lution to the full-specialization one.
3. As w increases, one can never switch from the fully diversiﬁed solution
to an asymmetric interior one.
The ﬁrst property is a direct consequence of Lemma 3. Now, we prove
the second result. Consider a range of w for which an asymmetric interior
solution (b x,w−b x) exists, where b x(w) is deﬁned by the asymmetric solution to
equation b0(b x)=b0(w−b x). We know from Proposition 2 that b x<w 0 <w−b x.
Let us study the function w 7−→ g(w)=b(w) − [b(b x(w)) + b(w − b x(w))].
Consider any solution w = w of equation g(w)=0 . We show that this





0(w − b x(w)).
Because w0 < w−b x(w) ≤ w, we have that b0 is decreasing between w−b x(w)
and w. It implies that b0(w−b x(w)) is larger than b0(w), or equivalently, that
g0(w) is nonpositive. It implies that if one switches between the fully special-
ized solution and the asymmetric interior solution when wealth increases, it
can only be from the former to the latter.
To prove the third result, consider a range of w for which an asymmetric
interior solution (b x,w − b x) exists, where b x(w) is deﬁned by the asymmetric
solution to equation b0(b x)=b0(w − b x). Let us study the function w 7−→
h(w)=b(b x(w)) + b(w − b x(w)) − 2b(w/2). Consider any solution w = w of
equation h(w)=0 . We show that this implies that h0(w) be nonpositive.
Indeed, by the envelope theorem, we have that
h
0(w)=b
0(w − b x(w)) − b
0(w/2).
We know from Proposition 2 that b x<w 0 <w− b x. We also know that b0
is increasing and then decreasing in interval [b x(w),w − b x(w)], and that the
values of b0 are the same at the boundaries of this interval. Because w/2
belongs to this interval, we have that b0(w/2) is larger than b0(w − b x(w)),
or equivalently, that h0(w) is nonpositive. It implies that if one switches
between the asymmetric interior solution and the equal solution when wealth
increases, it can only be from the former to the latter.¥
E Proof of Proposition 4
We ﬁrst prove that the ﬁrst-order condition b0(x)=b0(w −x) may have only
one root at x = w/2 when w 6=2 w0. Suppose by contradiction that there
34exists b x 6= w/2 such that b0(b x)=b0(w − b x). By symmetry, this can be true
only if b x = w−b x, or if w0 −(b x−w0)=w−b x.T h eﬁr s tc a s ei se q u i v a l e n tt o
b x = w/2, a contradiction. The second case is equivalent to w =2 w0,a l s oa
contradiction. Thus, x = w/2 is the only candidate for an interior optimum.
We then show that x = w/2 is a minimum of the objective function when
w is smaller than 2w0. To show this, we prove that b0(x) ≤ b0(w − x) for all
x smaller than w/2. Two case must be considered depending upon whether
w − x is smaller or larger than w0.W h e n w − x<w 0, both x and w − x
are smaller than w0. Because b0 is increasing in this range, we indeed obtain
that b0(x) ≤ b0(w − x) if x ≤ w − x, which is true. When w − x>w 0,xand
w−x are on opposite sides of w0.B u tb0(w−x)=b0(w0+(w−x−w0)) is by
symmetry equal to b0(w0−(w−x−w0)), w h o s ea r g u m e n ti ss m a l l e rt h a nw0.
Because b0 is increasing in this range, it implies that b0(x) ≤ b0(x+(2w0−w))
if w ≤ 2w0, which is also true.
A parallel proof can be written when w is larger than 2w0.¥
F Proof of the Proposition 5
Suppose b is PD and there exist w and b x such that b0 (b x)=b0 (w − b x) with



















As b0 is decreasing for x ≥ x0, the above equality thus implies that w − ³
w0 −b δ
´
≤ w0 + b δ, hence w ≤ 2w0. Therefore, if w and b x exist, we must
have that w ≤ 2w0.T h u s , i f w>2w0, no interior asymmetric interior
solution exists and the solution belongs to {w,w/2}.B u tw ek n o wt h a tf o ra
PD beneﬁtf u n c t i o n2w0 >w 2.T h e r e f o r e ,i fw>2w0, 2b(w/2) >b(w) and
the allocation {w/2} is the solution for w>2w0. ¥
35G Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose b is LU and there exist w and b x such that b0 (b x)=b0 (w − b x) with
b x<w 0 < w − b x.D e ﬁne δ ∈ [0,w 0] such that b x = w0 − δ.W eh a v et h a t
b0 (b x)=b0 (w0 − δ),
= b0 (w − b x),
= b0 (w − (w0 − δ)),
≤ b0 (w0 + δ).
As b0 is decreasing for x ≥ x0, the above equality thus implies that w −
(w0 − δ) ≥ w0+δ, hence w ≥ 2w0.T h e r e f o r e ,i fw and b x exist, we must have
that w ≥ 2w0.T h u s , i f w ≤ 2w0, no interior asymmetric interior solution
exists and the solution belongs to {w,w/2}. However, in this case, w/2 is a
local minimum Therefore, if w ≤ 2w0, the solution is the full-specialization
strategy {0,w}.
W en o wf o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r ew>2w0,a sb x = w0 − δ, the condition
on function z implies that w(δ) − b x(δ) − (w0 + δ) is an increasing function,
where w(δ) is deﬁned by b0 (b x(δ)) = b0 (w(δ) − b x(δ)).T h e r e f o r e ,w0 (δ) ≥ 0.
Diﬀerentiating b0 (b x(δ)) = b0 (w(δ) − b x(δ)) with respect to δ and recalling
that b x(δ)=w0 − δ lead to (w0 (δ)+1 )b00 (w(δ) − b x(δ)) = −b00 (b x(δ)).A s
w0 (δ) ≥ 0,t h i si m p l i e st h a tb00 (w(δ) − b x(δ)) + b00(b x(δ)) ≥ 0 and the asym-
metric interior solution is a local minimum and is not a potential candidate
for the optimal allocation. The solution to (4) belongs thus to {w,w/2}.¥
HP r o o f o f L e m m a 6
W ea r eg o i n gt op r o v et h i sl e m m ai nt h r e es t e p s .F i r s t ,s i n c eb is a convex






2b(w0),m e a n i n gt h a tw0 <w 2.
Concerning the uniqueness of the thresholds deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 8 ) ,l e t




















is strictly negative when x>i w 0 (since b0 is de-
creasing on [w0,+∞[) and is strictly positive when x<(i − 1)w0 (since b0 is
increasing on [0,w 0]). We hereafter show that there exists a unique a such
that f0
i (a)=0 . Suppose by contradiction that there exist a and c,w i t h



































































Therefore, a is unique and fi is increasing on [0,a] and decreasing on [a,+∞[.
36As fi (0) = 0, if a positive zero wi exists to fi, it is unique. fi changes sign
only once, from positive to negative.
Now, we prove that wi <w i+1,∀i =2 ...n−1. According to equation (8),



















. We have already proved that function
x 7→ b(x)/x is single peaked, increasing on [0,w 1] and then decreasing on










to hold, it must
b et h ec a s et h a t
wi+1
i+1 <w 1 and
wi+1
i >w 1,o re q u i v a l e n t l yiw1 <w i+1 <
























,m e a n i n gt h a twi+1 >w i.¥
I Proof of Proposition 7
We are going to prove this result using an induction argument.
First with two beneﬁt functions, we know according to Proposition 4
that when w<w 2, then the optimal allocation is x∗ (w)={w,0} and when
w ≥ w2, then the optimal allocation is x∗ (w)={w/2,w/2}.
Now, we suppose that the result holds when the investor has the choice
between n − 1 projects. Let us prove that it holds when the investor has n
projects. According to the previous discussion, we maximize the investor’s
program in two steps. First, we solve
max
x1,...,xn−2
b(x1)+... + b(xn−1)+b(w − x1 − ... − xn−1).
As the result holds when the investor has the choice between n−1 projects,







w − xn−1 if w − xn−1 ≤ w2,
w−xn−1
2 if w2 <w− xn−1 ≤ w3,
...
w−xn−1






⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if w − xn−1 ≤ w2,
...
w−xn−1
i if wi <w− xn−1 ≤ wi+1,
...
w−xn−1
n−1 if w − xn−1 >w n−1,
∀i =2 ,...n − 2.
37There remains to solve the second step. Suppose that wi <w− xn−1 ≤











xn−1 ≥ w − wi+1. (17)
The ﬁrst order conditions, b0 (xn−1)=b0 ((w − xn−1)/i),l e a dt ot h ef o l -
lowing candidate solutions
1. xn−1 =( w − xn−1)/i,t h e nxn−1 = w






















n−1 the asymmetric interior solution 1,
3. x2















/i < w0 <
x2
n−1 (maximization problem (7) is not symmetric anymore). In this
case, condition (17) leads to w>w 0+wi.W ec a l lx2
n−1 the asymmetric
interior solution 1. There are also the two corner solutions,
4. xn−1 = w but this can be eliminated because condition (17) leads to
wi < 0,
5. xn−1 =0 .
We are going to prove that the two asymmetric interior solutions x1
n−1
and x2
n−1 do not exist. We ﬁrst focus on x1
n−1. To do so, we study the sec-
























> 0 since x1
n−1 <w 0.
Thus, the asymmetric interior solution, if it exists is a local minimum.
To eliminate the other asymmetric interior solution, we ﬁrst prove an
intermediate result, that is, when the beneﬁt function is symmetric, then











= b(w0 + δ), implying that δ = w0
i−1 and





.S i n c e b is a symmetric function, b(w0 + δ)=






− ib(w0)=( i − 1)b(w0 + δ) − ib(w0),
=( i − 1)(2b(w0) − b(w0 − δ)) − ib(w0),















≥ 0 since b is convex on [0,w 0].
Therefore, wi ≥ iw0,∀i =2 ,...,n − 1. Let us now turn to the study of
x2












h a st ob es t r i c t l yg r e a t e rt h a nw0 implying that w<(i +1 )w0.M o r e o v e r ,
condition (17), w−x2
n−1 >w i, or equivalently iw > (i − 1)wi+2ix0 has to be
satisﬁed. In order these two inequalities to be compatible, we need i−1
i wi +
2w0 < (i +1 )w0,t h a ti se q u i v a l e n tt owi <i w 0. This not true, therefore, the
asymmetric interior solution x2
n−1 does not exist and the optimal strategy
xn−1 is either equal to w
i+1 or to 0.¥
J Proof of Proposition 8
As in the symmetric case, we are going to prove this result using an induction
argument.
First of all with two beneﬁt functions, we know according to Proposition
6 that when w<w 2, the optimal allocation is x∗ (w)={w,0} and when
w ≥ w2,t h eo p t i m a la l l o c a t i o ni sx∗ (w)={w/2,w/2}.
Now, we suppose that the result holds when the investor has the choice
between n−1 projects. Let us prove that it then holds when the investor has
n projects. According to the previous discussion, we maximize the investor’s
program in two steps. First of all, we solve
max
x1,...,xn−2
b(x1)+... + b(xn−1)+b(w − x1 − ... − xn−1).
As the result holds when the investor has the choice between n−1 projects,







w − xn−1 if w − xn−1 ≤ w2,
w−xn−1
2 if w2 <w− xn−1 ≤ w3,
...
w−xn−1






⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if w − xn−1 ≤ w2,
...
w−xn−1
i if wi <w− xn−1 ≤ xi+1,
...
w−xn−1
n−1 if w − xn−1 >w n−1,
∀i =2 ,...n − 2.
There remains to solve the second step. Suppose that wi <w− xn−1 ≤











xn−1 ≥ w − wi+1. (18)
The ﬁrst order conditions, b0 (xn−1)=b0 ((w − xn−1)/i),l e a dt ot h ef o l -
lowing candidate solutions
1. xn−1 =( w − xn−1)/i,t h e nxn−1 = w






















n−1 the asymmetric interior solution 1,
3. x2















/i < w0 <
x2
n−1 (maximization problem (7) is not symmetric anymore). In this
case, condition (18) leads to w>w 0+wi.W ec a l lx2
n−1 the asymmetric
interior solution 1. There are also the two corner solutions,
4. xn−1 = w but this can be eliminated because condition (18) leads to
wi < 0,
5. xn−1 =0 .
We are going to prove that the two asymmetric interior solutions x1
n−1
and x2
n−1 do not exist. We ﬁrst focus on x1
n−1.I f w e d e ﬁne δ1 ∈ [0,w 0]
such that x1
n−1 = w0 − δ1, z (δ1)=( w(δ1) − (i +1 )w0 − (i − 1)δ1)/i.A s
it is increasing by assumption, w0 (δ1) ≥ i − 1.B u t w(δ1) is deﬁned by
b0 (w0 − δ1)=b0 ((w(δ1) − w0 + δ1)/i).D i ﬀerentiating this expression with






00 ((w − w0 + δ1)/i).
40As w0 (δ1) ≥ i−1, (w0 (δ1)+1 )/i ≥ 1, and the following inequalities hold:
b00 (w0 − δ1)=-
w0(δ1)+1
i b00 ((w − w0 + δ1)/i),
≥− b00 ((w − w0 + δ1)/i),
≥− (1/i)b00 ((w − w0 + δ1)/i).
Therefore b00 (w0 − δ1)+1
ib00 ((w − w0 + δ1)/i) ≥ 0 and the asymmetric
interior solution 1, if it exists, is unique and is a local minimum.
Before studying x2
n−1, let us prove an intermediate result, that is wi >i w 0,













0 b0 (w0 − δ)dδ − (i − 1)
R w0
i−1
0 b0 (w0 + δ)dδ,
≤
R w0
0 b0 (w0 − δ)dδ −
R w0
i−1









b0 (w0 − δ)dδ − (i − 2)
R w0
i−1

















Therefore, wi >i w 0, ∀i ≥ 2. We thereafter focus on the solution x2
n−1















/2 <w 0 <x 2
n−1.
There exists δ2 > 0 such that x2
n−1 = w0 + δ2. In this case,
z (δ2)=( w(δ2)+( i − 1)δ2 − (i +1 )w0)/i.
Condition (18) implies that w − x2
n−1 >w i. Let us deﬁne F (δ2)=w(δ2) −
w0 − δ2 − wi Condition (18) implies that F (δ2) > 0,∀δ2 > 0. F0 (δ2)=
w0 (δ2)−1.R e c a l lt h a tw(δ2) is deﬁned by b0 (w0 + δ2)=b0 ((w(δ2) − w0 − δ2)/i).
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to δ2, this leads to
b00 (w0 + δ2)=1 /i(w0 (δ2) − 1)b00((w(δ2) − w0 − δ2)/i).
This last equality holds if and only if w0 (δ2)−1 < 0. Therefore F (δ2) is
strictly decreasing. F (0) = w(0) − w0 − wi and w(0) = (i +1 )w0 for a LU
beneﬁt function. Therefore, F (0) < 0 and condition (18)is violated and this
asymmetric interior solution 2 cannot exist for a LU beneﬁt function.
The two asymmetric interior solutions have been eliminated, thus xn−1 =
w
i+1 or xn−1 =0and the proposition is proved.¥
K Proof of Proposition 9
The ﬁrst two candidate solutions are the two corner solutions. Let us now fo-












>b 0 (w − b x). There are four






>b 0 (w − b x) with e x
j >w 0 and w − b x>w 0.A sb0 is decreasing
∀x>w 0, it is the case if and only if w0 < e x







+ b00 (w − b x) ≤ 0,i ss a t i s ﬁed because of the con-
cavity of function b on [w0,+∞[. This candidate solution is therefore






>b 0 (w − b x) with e x














>b 0 (w − b x) with e x
j <w 0 and w−b x>w 0. This candidate turns













>b 0 (w − b x) with e x
j >w 0 and w−b x<w 0. This candidate turns







+ b00 (w − b x) ≤ 0.¥
L Proof of Proposition 10
The ﬁrst result is an application of Lemma 1. Concerning the other results,
they are similar to the results of Proposition 3. We are going to prove the
following ﬁve results:
1. As w increases, one can never switch from the interior solution 2 to the
allocation that gives the whole budget to project b,
2. As w increases, one can never switch from the interior solution 1 to the
interior solution 2,
3. As w increases, one can never switch from the interior solution 1 to the
allocation that gives the whole budget to project c,
4. As w increases, one can never switch from the interior solution 1 to the
allocation that gives the whole budget to project b,
425. As w increases, one can never switch from the interior solution 1 to the
interior solution 3.
We successively prove the ﬁve assertions.
1. Consider a range of w for which an interior solution 2 (b x2,w− b x2)













j )+b(w − b x2(w))
i
. Consider any solution w = w of
equation g1(w)=0 . We show that this implies that g0
1(w) be nonposi-





0(w − b x
2(w)).
As w>w− b x2 (w) >w 0, b0 is decreasing and b0 (w) <b 0 (w − b x2 (w)).
Therefore, g0
1(w) is nonpositive. It implies that if one switches between
the allocation that gives the whole budget to project b to the interior
solution 2, it can only be from the former to the latter.
2. Consider a range of w for which an interior solution 1 (b x1,w− b x1)
a n da ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n2(b x2,w− b x2) exist, where b x2(w) is deﬁned by








j <w 0 <w− b x2 (w) and where
















j )+b(w − b x1(w))
i
. Consider any solution w =
w of equation g2(w)=0 . We show that this implies that g0
2(w) be




0(w − b x
2(w)) − b
0(w − b x
1(w)).
As b x2(w) <j x 0 < b x1(w), w−b x2(w) > w−b x1(w) >w 0, by assumption.
Therefore, b0 is decreasing and b0 (w − b x2(w)) <b 0 (w − b x1(w)).T h e r e -
fore, g0
2(w) is nonpositive. It implies that if one switches between the
interior solution 2 to the interior solution 1, it can only be from the
former to the latter.
3. Consider a range of w for which an interior solution 1 (b x1,w− b x1)



















j )+b(w − b x1(w))
i
. Consider any solution w = w of
equation g3(w)=0 . We show that this implies that g0
3(w) be nonposi-






































= b0(w−b x1(w)). Therefore, g0
3(w) is nonpositive. It implies
t h a ti fo n es w i t c h e sb e t w e e nt h ea l l o c a t i o nt h a tg i v e st h ew h o l eb u d g e t
to project c to the interior solution 1, it can only be from the former
to the latter.
4. Consider a range of w for which an interior solution 1 (b x1,w− b x1)














j )+b(w − b x1(w))
i
. Consider any solution w = w of
equation g4(w)=0 . We show that this implies that g0
4(w) be nonposi-





0(w − b x
1(w)).
As w>w− b x1 (w) >w 0, b0 is decreasing and b0 (w) <b 0 (w − b x1 (w)).
Therefore, g0
4(w) is nonpositive. It implies that if one switches between
the allocation that gives the whole budget to project b to the interior
solution 1, it can only be from the former to the latter.
5. Consider a range of w for which an interior solution 1 (b x1,w− b x1)
a n da ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n3(b x3,w− b x3) exist, where b x3(w) is deﬁned by






with w − b x3 (w) <w 0 <
e x3(w)
j and where
















j )+b(w − b x1(w))
i
. Consider any solution w =
w of equation g5(w)=0 . We show that this implies that g0
5(w) be




0(w − b x
3(w)) − b
0(w − b x
1(w)).
44As w − b x3 (w) <w 0 <
e x3(w)
j and w0 <
e x1(w)
j <w− b x1 (w),i tf o l l o w s




j <w− b x1 (w). g0
5(w)=b0(w −





























.T h e r e f o r e , g0
5(w)
is nonpositive. It implies that if one switches between the interior
solution 3 to the interior solution 1, it can only be from the former to
the latter.¥
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